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Abstract
Facebook has recently been subject to scrutiny by privacy regulators in Europe, as well as by the US Federal
Trade Commission, in relation to the introduction of its ‘tag suggest’ feature. This feature uses face recognition
technology to create a biometric template of users’ faces, and had been introduced to Facebook users as a
default (opt-out) setting. One outcome of the recent scrutiny has been the temporary deactivation of the tag
suggest feature. However, there is every indication that Facebook intends to re-introduce the feature in the not
too distant future. This article canvasses some of the privacy implications of face recognition technology,
particularly as it is used by Facebook, and in the private sector generally. Legal implications of Facebook’s use
of biometric templates and the generation and use of biometric information are considered by reference to the
Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) as recently amended by the Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act
2012 (Cth). In particular, the threshold issue of the application of Australia’s federal information privacy laws
to overseas organisations that have no presence in Australia and do not have servers in the country is
considered. Definitional issues around the fundamental terms ‘collect’ and ‘receive’, as used in the amended
Privacy Act, are also discussed, along with an overview of possible compliance risks for Facebook arising from
Australia’s information privacy regime. Finally, the article offers some reflections on the efficacy of Australian
information privacy laws in regulating the creation and use of biometric face templates and associated
information in the social media context.
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Facebook has recently been subject to scrutiny by privacy regulators in Europe, as well 
as by the US Federal Trade Commission, in relation to the introduction of its ‘tag 
suggest’ feature. This feature uses face recognition technology to create a biometric 
template of users’ faces, and had been introduced to Facebook users as a default (opt-
out) setting. One outcome of the recent scrutiny has been the temporary deactivation 
of the tag suggest feature. However, there is every indication that Facebook intends to 
re-introduce the feature in the not too distant future. This article canvasses some of the 
privacy implications of face recognition technology, particularly as it is used by 
Facebook, and in the private sector generally. Legal implications of Facebook’s use of 
biometric templates and the generation and use of biometric information are considered 
by reference to the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) as recently amended by the Privacy 
Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012 (Cth). In particular, the 
threshold issue of the application of Australia’s federal information privacy laws to 
overseas organisations that have no presence in Australia and do not have servers in 
the country is considered. Definitional issues around the fundamental terms ‘collect’ 
and ‘receive’, as used in the amended Privacy Act, are also discussed, along with an 
overview of possible compliance risks for Facebook arising from Australia’s 
information privacy regime. Finally, the article offers some reflections on the efficacy of 
Australian information privacy laws in regulating the creation and use of biometric 
face templates and associated information in the social media context. 
The use of biometric information and face recognition technology is no longer the 
domain of government security agencies and science fiction films. One expert has 
conservatively estimated that 54% of the US population already has a biometric 
template of their facial features (or a ‘face print’) stored, not in an FBI computer 
database but on a Facebook server.1 Face recognition technology has traditionally 
                                                                
* Lecturer, Curtin Law School, Curtin University. This article, as well as its title, was 
inspired by a piece by Nick Schifrin, for Nightline, ABC News (US), broadcast 10 June 2011. 
1  Jennifer Lynch, Submission to Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on 
Privacy, Technology and the Law, What Facial Recognition Technology Means for Privacy and 
Civil Liberties, 18 July 2012, 2. While Facebook has temporarily disabled its face 
recognition tool in the US, this does not necessarily mean that Facebook has deleted 
templates it already holds in its database: this is discussed further below.  
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been used by governments and organisations to verify identities for the purpose of 
security 2  and law enforcement. 3  More recently, however, applications of the 
technology target its use by individuals for their own purposes, whether that is the 
easy identification of friends in photographs uploaded on social media sites or to 
access personal information about people from their photograph.4  
While there are no doubt many positive uses of facial recognition technology, at both 
an individual and a societal level,5 the technology also poses a number of risks and 
may be intrusive of an individual’s privacy.6 In 2008 the Australian Law Reform 
Commission (ALRC) released a comprehensive report into Australian Privacy Law 
and Practice.7 One section of the report deals specifically with biometric technology 
and notes some of the concerns around its use. Broadly, these concerns relate to the 
fact that the widespread use of biometric systems allows for mass surveillance of 
individuals; that technology such as facial recognition may allow people to be 
                                                                
2  Such as systems used to control access to physical spaces and computer systems, as well 
as those used at airports: see generally Thomas Huang, Ziyou Xiong and Zhenqiu Zhang, 
‘Face Recognition Applications’ in Stan Z. Li and Anil K. Jain (eds), Handbook of Face 
Recognition (Springer, 2nd ed, 2011) 617 and the use of biometrics in passports:  Jens-
Martin Loebel, ‘Is Privacy Dead?  - GPS-Based Geolocation and Facial Recognition 
Systems’ in, Hercheui, M.D. et al. (Eds.): ICT Critical Infrastructures and Society: 10th IFIP 
TC 9 International Conference on Human Choice and Computers, International Federation for 
Information Processing (Springer-Verlag 2012) 338, 342. 
3  Applications of facial recognition technology for law enforcement include suspect 
identification and the exclusion of specific individuals from venues, such as casinos: see 
generally Huang, Xiong, and Zhang, above n 2, 617. 
4  See, eg, Emma Woollacott, Google Snaps Up Facial Recognition Firm (25 July 2011) TG Daily 
<http://www.tgdaily.com/business-and-law-features/57446-google-snaps-up-facial-
recognition-firm>.  
5  One application of facial recognition technology is in the verification of individual 
identities, or identity management. A former Australian Federal Privacy Commissioner 
noted that this can assist in fraud prevention, the enhancing of national security and even 
improved targeting of goods and services to customers, particularly in an electronic 
environment: see Malcolm Crompton, ‘Proof of ID Required? Getting Identity 
Management Right’ (Paper presented at the Australia IT Security Forum, 30 March 2004).  
6  See, eg, Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law 
and Practice, Report No 108 (2008) vol 1, 409 [9.72] (‘ALRC Report’) quoting the Council of 
Europe which cautions that before the introduction of a biometric system: ‘[t]he controller 
should balance the possible advantages and disadvantages for the data subject’s private 
life on the one hand and the envisaged purposes on the other hand, and consider other 
alternatives that are less intrusive for private life’ (reference omitted).  
7  Ibid.  
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identified without their knowledge or consent; and that the use of this technology 
could reveal sensitive information about an individual, such as information about the 
individual’s health or religious beliefs.8 Concerns were also expressed around the 
security of information gathered by biometric systems and the dangers that would be 
presented should that information fall into the wrong hands. The ALRC also noted 
that concerns have been raised regarding the accuracy of biometric technology, and 
that where such technology is inherent in identification systems individuals may be 
misidentified (or not identified at all when they should be).9 
Since the mid-1990s the number of face recognition systems and the commercial 
exploitation of those systems has grown exponentially. Some have attributed this 
growth to the emergence of new applications and the growing sophistication and 
increased affordability of the technology. 10  One current application of face 
recognition technology is in enabling social network users to quickly attach a name, 
or ‘tag’, to photographs of individuals uploaded onto a social media website. This 
technology is in use by Facebook in the form of its ‘tag suggest’ feature and has 
attracted significant attention from the public, the media, and governments, 
particularly in Europe and the US. 
In 2011 and 2012 the Irish Data Protection Commissioner (DPC) conducted audits of 
Facebook that focussed, inter alia, on the use by the organisation of face recognition 
technology. 11  Facebook has also been subject to investigation by German and 
Norwegian data protection authorities for the use of its face recognition technology.12 
One outcome arising from this scrutiny has been Facebook’s agreement to disable the 
tag suggest feature for European users, at least temporarily.13 Although this decision 
hit headlines, the subsequent disabling of the tag suggest feature in the US (and, it 
would seem, globally) happened much more quietly, with Facebook being reported 
as saying that its decision to turn off the tag suggest tool was to allow for 
                                                                
8  Ibid, vol 1, 408-409 [9.71]. 
9  Ibid. 
10  Huang, Xiong, and Zhang, above n 2, 617. 
11  Data Protection Commissioner (Ireland), Facebook Ireland Ltd: Report of Audit, 21 December 
2011; Data Protection Commissioner (Ireland), Facebook Ireland Ltd: Report of Re-Audit, 21 
September 2012. 
12  ‘Germany Re-opens Facebook Facial Recognition Probe’ BBC Technology News (online), 15 
August 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-19274341>; Stephanie Bodonie, 
‘Facebook Faces Norway Probe Over Facial-Recognition Tags’, Bloomberg Business Week 
(online), 2 August 2012 <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-08-02/facebook-faces-
norway-probe-over-facial-recognition-photo-tags>. 
13  ‘Germany Re-opens Facebook Facial Recognition Probe’, above n 12. 
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improvements in its efficiency.14 At the time of writing the tag suggest feature is still 
not available for users of Facebook, including for those in Australia, where the 
feature had previously been enabled as a default setting (opt-out not opt-in) on user 
accounts. Despite the fact that the tag suggest feature is still unavailable, there is 
every indication that it will be reinstated. Facebook’s user settings still refer to tag 
suggest (albeit showing that the tool is not yet available) and the Facebook Data Use 
Policy (amended as recently as December 2012) makes reference to the fact that 
Facebook is able to suggest tags by scanning and comparing photographs uploaded 
by friends to information gathered from other photographs in which an individual 
has been tagged.15 Given this, and the fact that Facebook has only recently acquired 
Face.com, a large face recognition technology firm, for a price in the tens of millions 
of dollars,16 it seems likely that the tag suggest feature will be re-launched in the near 
future.  
This article considers the efficacy of Australia’s recently amended information 
privacy laws in dealing with privacy risks posed by facial recognition technology, 
particularly in the context of the use of that technology by private sector 
organisations. Given the fact that Facebook holds such a large repository of images17 
and probably operates (or has the ability to operate) one of the most well-developed 
face recognition systems of all private sector entities,18 the social-media giant is the 
focus of this discussion. However, many of the issues canvassed arise from 
technological advancements and social media trends more generally, and the legal 
position discussed has broader application for organisations outside of Australia. 
This article considers some of the threshold and definitional issues which determine 
whether the recently amended Australian information privacy laws are capable of 
                                                                
14  Somini Sengupta and Kevin J O’Brien, ‘Facebook can ID Faces, But Using Them Grows 
Tricky’, NYTimes (online), 21 September 2012 <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/22/ 
technology/facebook-backs-down-on-face-recognition-in-europe.html?_r=0>. 
15  Facebook, Data Use Policy (11 December 2012) <http://www.facebook.com/full_data_ 
use_policy>; Facebook, Statement of Rights and Responsibilities (11 December 2012) 
<http://www.facebook.com/legal/terms>. 
16  Alexia Tsotsis, ‘Facebook Scoops Up Face.com for $55-60 to Bolster Its Facial Recognition 
Tech (Updated)’, TechCrunch (online), 18 June 2012 <http://techcrunch.com/ 2012/06/ 
18/facebook-scoops-up-face-com-for-100m-to-bolster-its-facial-recognition-tech/>. 
17  See, eg, Electronic Privacy Information Centre (EPIC) noting ‘Facebook is the largest 
photo-sharing site in the world by a wide margin’: EPIC, In re Facebook and the Facial 
Identification of Users, Complaint to Federal Trade Commission (US), 10 June 2011, 8 [36]. 
See also Lynch, above n 1, 10: ‘Facebook has amassed possibly the largest database of face 
prints in the world.’ 
18  Lynch, above n 1, 9-10. 
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applying to organisations, such as Facebook, which do not have a physical presence 
in Australia.19 This involves consideration of the extra-territorial application of the 
Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (‘Privacy Act’) in its amended form,20 and consideration of 
whether photographs, associated information and biometric templates constitute 
personal information and sensitive information for the purposes of the Act. There 
then follows an overview of some of the possible areas of non-compliance with the 
amended Privacy Act in relation to Facebook’s use of face recognition technology and 
a discussion as to the efficacy of Australian information privacy laws in regulating 
the creation and use of face templates and associated information.  
I  FACEBOOK AND FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY 
The fact that Facebook has the ability to use face recognition technology may not be 
immediately apparent, even to Facebook users, as there is no mention of the words 
‘face recognition’, or similar terms, in any of the Facebook terms of use, nor in its 
Privacy Policy. 21  However, a Facebook information page describes how face 
recognition technology enables the ‘tag suggest’ feature, first introduced in 2011.22 
Facebook describes that feature as follows:  
We currently use facial recognition software that uses an algorithm to 
calculate a unique number (“template”) based on someone’s facial features, 
like the distance between the eyes, nose and ears. This template is based on 
photos you’ve been tagged in on Facebook. We use this template to suggest 
tags to you when you’re adding a new photo to Facebook … Thus, when a 
new photograph of an individual in the ‘face print’ database is uploaded to 
                                                                
19  Although Facebook has a registered company (Facebook Pty Ltd) in Australia, the 
Australian company has been established to deal directly with advertisers. To the extent 
that the Australian company deals with personal information, it would be subject to the 
Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (‘Privacy Act’) similar to any other Australian organisation. 
However, this article deals with the personal information collected, received, created, 
held and used about individuals in Australia through the Facebook website. The 
Facebook statement of rights and responsibilities, which forms part of the contract 
between Facebook and registered users who are outside the US, is made with Facebook 
Ireland Ltd. Facebook has also insisted that Irish law applies to its entire European 
operation: Anupam Chander, ‘Facebookistan’ (2012) 90 North Carolina Law Review 1807, 
1835. 
20  Privacy Act s 5B and Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012 (Cth) sch 4 
(‘Privacy Amendment Act’). 
21  Facebook, Data Use Policy, above n 15.  
22  EPIC, above n 17, 10 [49].  
5
Bunn: Facebook and face recognition
Published by ePublications@bond, 2013
(2013) 25.1 BOND LAW REVIEW 
40 
Facebook, the facial recognition software is able to automatically suggest the 
name of the person in the new photograph.23  
In its information page on tagging, Facebook informs users that if, for any reason, the 
user does not want automatic tag suggestions of their name to be made when 
photographs of them are uploaded to Facebook, the user is able to disable the 
automatic tagging feature in their privacy settings. According to Facebook, 
individual biometric templates that enable the tag suggestions feature, often 
colloquially referred to as ‘face prints’,24 are deleted when that user disables the 
automatic tagging feature.25  
However, certain aspects of the way in which Facebook uses the technology behind 
this feature remain unclear. In a report to the US Senate in 2012, an attorney with the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation noted that Facebook refuses to reveal the number of 
actual photographs it holds in its database and whether or not it creates a face print 
for non-Facebook users.26 Certainly Facebook users are able to manually tag anyone 
who appears in a photograph uploaded to Facebook, whether the person is a 
Facebook user or not.27 In addition, even if a Facebook user has disabled the tag 
suggest feature for photographs of themselves (or if the feature is not available), 
other users are still able to manually tag the user in photographs. Those tags will 
exist unless and until such time as the user deletes the tag.28 Despite the fact that 
Facebook confirms that it deletes the face print for a user who has disabled tag 
suggestions, this does not mean that the template will not be or cannot be recreated 
as a result of others manually tagging photographs of the user thereafter. Facebook 
informs users that whenever they are tagged in a photograph, that tag will be 
associated with the user’s account and compared with all other tags associated with 
the user’s account to create, what Facebook terms, a ‘summary of this comparison’.29 
It is this summary information that is used to generate a ‘template’. Importantly, 
Facebook does not represent to users that summary information will not be collected 
                                                                
23  Facebook, Tagging Photos <http://www.facebook.com/help/463455293673370/>. 
24  See generally Lynch, above n 1.  
25  Facebook, Tagging Photos, above n 23. This is also confirmed by the Irish Data 
Commissioner Office’s 2012 audit review of Facebook: Data Protection Commissioner 
(Ireland), Facebook Ireland Ltd: Report of Re-Audit, 21 September 2012, 54 [2.8].  
26  Lynch, above n 1. Information provided by Facebook itself would seem to suggest that a 
face-print is not actually created in respect of those who are not users of Facebook. 
Although, information from which a template is able to be created is probably retained: 
see Facebook, Tagging Photos, above n 23 and EPIC, above n 17, 25 [109]. 
27  Facebook, Tagging Photos, above n 23. 
28  Ibid. 
29  Ibid. 
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when a user is manually tagged in a photograph: in fact, to the contrary, Facebook 
informs users that, to avoid this summary information being held by Facebook, it 
would be necessary for a user either to never have been tagged or to have untagged 
themselves in every photograph that exists on the site.30  
II  PRIVACY IMPLICATIONS OF FACIAL RECOGNITION 
TECHNOLOGY 
One consequence of recent advances in face recognition technology was illustrated in 
an experiment carried out by researchers from Carnegie-Mellon University.31 The 
research proved, conceptually at least, that a combination of publicly available Web 
2.0 data (such as photographs posted to Facebook), cloud computing, data mining, 
and face recognition software is ‘bringing us closer to a world where anyone may run 
face recognition on anyone else, online and offline - and then infer additional, 
sensitive data about the target subject, starting merely from one anonymous piece of 
information about her: the face.’32 In the social media context, the combination of face 
recognition technology capabilities with information posted by social media users 
themselves - such as the identification of friends (through the practice of naming or 
‘tagging’ people in photographs) and the provision of geolocation data (whereby 
users allow their GPS coordinates at given times to be posted to their social media 
sites33) - allows what one researcher has described as ‘unprecedented tracking’ of 
social media users and as something that poses a ‘very real threat of abuse.’34 The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) also recognises 
the danger that biometric systems in general increase the ease by which large-scale 
surveillance can be undertaken.35 
                                                                
30  Ibid. 
31  Alessandro Acquisti, Ralph Gross and Fred Stutzman, Faces of Facebook: Privacy in the Age 
of Augmented Reality, 4 August 2011, <http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/face-
recognition-study-FAQ>. 
32  Ibid. 
33  For a description of how this works in relation to Facebook see Jacqui Cheng, ‘Facebook 
Adds Geolocation, Check-ins to iPhone and Web apps’, arstechnica (online), 19 August 
2010 <http://arstechnica.com/business/2010/08/facebook-adds-geolocation-to-iphone-web-
apps/>.  
34  Jens-Martin Loebel, above n 2, 62-63. 
35  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Committee for 
Information, Computer and Communications Technology, Biometric Based Technologies 
(2004), 12.  
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Specific concerns relating to the use of face recognition technology by Facebook have 
been raised by a number of public interest groups. For example, a complaint 
submitted to the US Trade Commission by the Electronic Privacy Information Center 
(EPIC), a US not-for-profit privacy research centre, notes that Facebook’s size and 
reach is ‘unparalleled’ among social networking services. 36  According to EPIC, 
Facebook is not only the world’s largest social networking site but holds the largest 
collection of photographs of any corporation in the world by a considerable margin.37 
The size of the collection of images on Facebook, and the fact that many of these can 
be linked to individuals, is significant given that, as EPIC notes in its complaint, 
government has an interest in accessing information held on social networking sites 
and law enforcement agencies have previously used information stored by Facebook 
in the pursuit of their investigations. 38  The Australian government readily 
acknowledges the importance it attaches to having the ability to access data and the 
content of certain communications in the interests of national security and crime 
prevention.39 Currently Australian law allows a broad range of enforcement agencies 
to intercept or obtain information communicated through or stored by 
telecommunication providers and Internet Service Providers (ISPs). 40  However, 
proposals recently advanced by the Australian government, and the subject of a 
government inquiry, 41  seek to extend this regime to a broader range of 
communication providers, including the operators of social media sites. 42  While 
consideration of the proposed reforms to national security laws is beyond the scope 
of this article, it is worth noting that the extent to which the reforms could allow 
relevant authorities to access templates, or ‘face prints’, held by social network 
                                                                
36  EPIC, above n 17, 8. 
37  Ibid [36]. See also Lynch, above n 1, 10. 
38  EPIC, above n 17, 19 [78]. See also LaLonde v LaLonde (Ky Ct App, No 2009-CA-002276-
MR) discussed here: <http://blog.internetcases.com/2011/03/12/facebook-privacy-photo-
tagging-attorney-chicago-lawyer-social-media/> in which a woman sought to appeal an 
order awarding custody of her daughter to the child’s father on the basis that, among 
other things, the court ‘improperly considered Facebook photos showing her drinking.’ 
The photographs were harmful to the woman’s custody claim because her psychologist 
had testified that the medication prescribed for her bipolar disorder would be adversely 
affected by the alcohol. See also Lynch, above n 1, 11, especially nn 60-62.  
39  ‘Equipping Australia against Emerging and Evolving Threats’ (Discussion Paper, 
Commonwealth Attorney-General, July 2012) 28. 
40  Ibid 27; Nigel Brew, ‘Telecommunications Data Retention – an Overview’ (Background 
Note, Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, 24 October 2012) 7. 
41  House of Representatives Joint Parliamentary Committee on Intelligence and Security, 
Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Potential Reforms of National Security Legislation (2012).  
42  ‘Equipping Australia against Emerging and Evolving Threats’, above n 39, 27. 
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providers such as Facebook is, as yet, undetermined.43 In this context it is also worth 
noting that Australia’s federal information laws allow organisations and agencies to 
disclose personal information where, inter alia, they believe that the information is 
necessary to prevent or detect a criminal offence or certain other breaches of law.44 
Another tangible risk arising from the use of face recognition technology to create 
‘face prints’ relates to the security and integrity of the biometric templates 
themselves. As one expert has noted in a submission to a US Senate Committee, the 
fact that face prints are not stored as images, but rather as algorithms, gives rise to 
the possibility that the algorithms could be changed within a particular database, or 
that the information may be leaked or stolen from the system.45 This would, in turn, 
have potentially serious consequences for misidentification, impersonation or 
identity theft.46 The accuracy of face recognition systems employed on a large-scale is 
also questionable.47 Although, given the size of its database, Facebook’s system has 
been described as more robust than most.48 There are also risks that the vast amount 
of data that can be generated by coupling face recognition with other technologies, 
such as geolocation (described above), may be misused. In its complaint to the US 
Federal Trade Commissions, EPIC averred that Facebook had failed to establish that 
applications developers, the government and other third parties would not be able to 
access the template information generated by Facebook.49 In relation to the issue of 
Facebook’s sharing of user data with applications, the Irish DPC’s office reported that 
it did not consider that Facebook’s ‘reliance on developer adherence to best practice 
or stated policy in certain cases is sufficient to ensure security of user data.’ 50 
Moreover, while the Irish DPC did not regard the information security practices of 
Facebook in general as unsatisfactory or problematic, a number of concerns were 
raised by that office around the protection of user data from employee abuse.51 There 
                                                                
43  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC), Submission No 183 to House 
of Representatives Joint Parliamentary Committee on Intelligence and Security, above n 
41, 15 [44], [45] and see especially n 35.  
44  Privacy Act sch 3, National Privacy Principle (NPP) 2.1; Privacy Amendment Act sch 1, 
Australian Privacy Principle (APP) 6.2.  
45  Lynch above n 1. See also OECD, above n 35, 13-15. 
46  Lynch above n 1 and OECD, above n 35, 13-15.  
47  Huang, Xiong, and Zhang, above n 2, 635. 
48  Lynch, above n 1, 9.  
49  EPIC, above n 17, 17 [71].  
50  Data Protection Commissioner (Ireland), above n 25, 8.  
51  Ibid 9.  
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have also been a number of reported incidents of security breaches in relation to 
Facebook itself,52 as well as other organisations holding large amounts of user data.53  
Aside from the various concerns discussed above, it has been noted that face 
recognition technology itself is becoming increasingly sophisticated.54 Various new 
integrations of that technology into people’s daily lives may be realised in the not too 
distant future. 55  One possible new application of the technology is in targeted 
marketing. For example, a US advertising agency has recently announced that it is 
finalising testing of technology that uses face recognition to automatically identify 
people captured on cameras installed in shops.56 Those individuals are then notified, 
via their smartphones, of customised deals in their location. Identification using face 
recognition technology is made possible by individuals authorising the marketing 
application to compare their image with photographs in which they have recently 
been tagged on Facebook; and the deals are customised by the application scanning 
information from the individual’s Facebook account.57 The risk of data being used in 
ways as yet unimagined is also compounded when data is retained for a long period 
of time. Today it may be the case that the sophistication of face recognition 
technology is not accurately able to link a photograph of an adult with biometric 
information extracted from photos of the same person as a child, but over a period of 
                                                                
52  See, eg, Hayley Tsukayama ’Facebook Security Breach Raises Concerns’, The Washington 
Post (online), 16 November 2011 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/ 
facebook-hack-raises-security-concerns/2011/11/15/gIQAqCyYPN_story.html>; Paul Lilly, 
Facebook Confirms Data Breach and Massive Vulnerability (11 October 2012) Hot Hardware 
<http://hothardware.com/News/Facebook-Confirms-Massive-Data-Breach-and-
Vulnerability/>.  
53  See, eg, Angela Moscaritolo, ‘Skype Reveals Security Breach; Facebook Launches Job 
App; Nexus 4 Sells Out’, PC Mag (online), 15 November 2012 <http://www.pcmag. 
com/article2/0,2817,2412148,00.asp>; Benn Grubb, ‘Hackers Steal Customer Data to Prove 
Risk of Retention Proposal’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 27 July 2012 
<http://www.smh.com.au/it-pro/security-it/hackers-steal-customer-data-to-prove-risk-of-
retention-proposal-20120726-22v67.html>; ‘AAPT Confirms Hackers Stole Customer 
Data’, ABC News (online), 27 July 2012 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-07-26/aapt-
confirms-hackers-stole-customer-data/4157946>. 
54  Lynch, above n 1, 14.  
55  See Huang, Xiong, and Zhang, above n 2, 636.  
56  Michael Walsh, ‘Facedeals: Facial Recognition Marketing Stirs Privacy Discussion Along 
With Excitement’, Daily News (online), 15 August 2012 <http://www.nydailynews.com/ 
news/national/facedeals-facial-recognition-marketing-stirs-privacy-discussion-
excitement-article-1.1137240>.  
57  RedPepper, Facedeals, <http://redpepperland.com/lab/details/check-in-with-your-face>. 
10
Bond Law Review, Vol. 25 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://epublications.bond.edu.au/blr/vol25/iss1/3
FACEBOOK AND FACE RECOGNITION 
45 
time, and in parallel with improvements in technology, far more accurate 
comparisons across large age discrepancies may become possible.58  
Given that photographs on Facebook will remain on Facebook indefinitely, at least 
until a user deletes photographs which they have uploaded, the risk that such 
photographs may be subject to increasingly sophisticated face recognition techniques 
is very real. In addition, given that Facebook enshrines within its Data Use Policy the 
right to change that policy from time to time (and does indeed make frequent 
changes to that policy, none of which require a user’s specific consent)59 there is the 
ever-present risk that photographs and face prints could be used in the future in 
ways not currently envisaged. The likelihood of this risk eventuating is not negligible 
when one considers that Facebook’s pictures may be its ‘most vital assets’ 60 and that 
increasing pressure is likely to be brought to bear on the organisation, by its 
investors, to monetize the information it holds.61 Indeed there may be inherent risks 
involved whenever a private company with access to face recognition technology, or 
the rich data source which such technology is able to provide, also has business 
interests in marketing and profiling.62 This risk is one that is recognised by the Office 
of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC). Noting that the outlay incurred 
by media platforms in providing services at no cost to users will, in many cases, be 
recovered through advertising, the OAIC observes that:  
[t]here is an inherent tension between this business model and the 
requirement to give individuals the ability to control, to the greatest extent 
possible, what happens to their personal information ... This tension will 
continue to challenge the traditional concepts of the regulation of the handling 
of personal information into the future.63  
Given the various ways in which the use of face recognition technology can implicate 
privacy, this article now turns to consider the extent to which Australian federal 
information privacy laws may be used to regulate the collection, creation and use of 
biometric information and biometric templates in the form of ‘face prints’. 
                                                                
58  Lynch, above n 1, 14.  
59  Facebook, Data Use Policy above n 15.  
60  Sengupta and O’Brien, above n 14.  
61  Anna Johnston and Stephen Wilson, ‘Privacy Compliance Risks for Facebook’ (2012) IEEE 
Technology and Society Magazine 59, 63.  
62  Jens-Martin Loebel, above n 2, 343. 
63  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Annual Report 2011-2012 (2012), xiv. 
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III  LEGAL POSITION 
According to EPIC, the US Supreme Court has made it clear that ‘both the common 
law and literal understanding of privacy encompass the individual’s control of 
information concerning his or her person.’64 In Australia, however, an individual’s 
control of information concerning his or her person is more limited: there is no 
constitutional or common law right to privacy as such,65 and generally the extent of 
privacy protection at common law is essentially confined to actions for breach of 
confidence and a limited range of torts, such as defamation and trespass, dealing 
with particular aspects of privacy.66 Information privacy in Australia is dealt with 
through a range of state-based and federal legislation. The Privacy Act  regulates the 
handling of personal information by federal government agencies 67  and certain 
private sector organisations.68 Amendments to the Privacy Act have recently been 
passed in the form of the Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012 
(Cth) (‘Privacy Amendment Act’), although most of the amendments will not 
commence until March 2014.69 
Private sector organisations bound by the Privacy Act are required to comply with 
certain baseline privacy standards, such as those set out in the National Privacy 
Principles enshrined within the Act itself,70 or in a binding privacy code which has 
been approved by the OAIC. 71  When amendments contained within the Privacy 
Amendment Act take effect, the National Privacy Principles (NPPs) will be replaced by 
a set of Australian Privacy Principles (APPs). These APPs will bind both relevant 
private sector organisations and government agencies alike, such bodies being 
referred to in the legislation as ‘APP entities’.72 The remainder of this article will focus 
                                                                
64  EPIC, above n 17, 4 [14] quoting US Department of Justice v Reporters Comm for Freedom of 
the Press, 489 US 749, 463 (1989). 
65  Although the ACT and Victoria have enacted legislation guaranteeing a right to privacy: 
see Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) s 12; Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 
2006 (Vic) s 13. 
66  For more detailed consideration of Australian laws that protect aspects of personal 
privacy see, eg, ALRC Report, above n 7, vol 3, 2550-2552 and New South Wales Law 
Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Consultation Paper No 1 (2007) 35-58. 
67  As defined in the Privacy Act s 6 but note that certain public sector agencies are 
completely exempt from the Privacy Act: at s 7. 
68  Ibid s 6C (definition of ‘organisation’). 
69  Privacy Amendment Act s 2. 
70  Privacy Act s 16A. The NPPs are set out at sch 3. 
71  Ibid s 16A.  
72  Privacy Amendment Act s 15. The APPs themselves are set out at sch 1. The APPs will bind 
all ‘APP entities’ defined as ‘an agency or organisation’: at sch 1(6). 
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on the possible application of the amended Privacy Act and the new APPs to 
Facebook, particularly in relation to that organisation’s use of face recognition 
technology. 
A  Does the Amended Privacy Act Apply to Facebook? 
A number of commentators have specifically discussed the application of the Privacy 
Act to personal information held by Facebook. 73  A former Australian Privacy 
Commissioner has indicated that Facebook’s practices may not comply with the 
privacy principles under the Privacy Act.74 Before recent amendments to the Privacy 
Act were introduced, however, it was at best unclear whether the Act was intended 
to apply to the acts and practices of organisations such as Facebook (that is, to 
organisations which are incorporated outside of Australia, do not have a physical 
presence in Australia, and whose servers are all located outside of Australia75). This is 
because the extra-territorial provisions of the Act provide that the legislation will 
only apply to the acts or practices of an organisation not incorporated in Australia 
(and not otherwise described in the section) if it fulfils two specified conditions: first, 
that the organisation carries on business in Australia; and secondly, that the 
organisation collects or holds information in Australia.76 The OAIC has submitted 
that the meaning of ‘in Australia’ is unclear, particularly in the online context.77  
                                                                
73  See, eg, Johnston and Wilson, above n 61; Veronica Scott and Kate Ballis, Facebook, Photos, 
Journalists, and Privacy – Some Legal Issues Arising From the Ben Grubb Affair (24 May 2011) 
Intellect  <http://tmtblog.minterellison.com/2011/05/facebook-photos-journalists-and-
privacy.html>. 
74  Asher Moses, ‘Privacy Watchdog Puts Bite on Facebook’, The Sydney Morning Herald 
(online), 23 July 2009 <http://www.smh.com.au/technology/biz-tech/privacy-watchdog-
puts-bite-on-facebook-20090723-du79.html>. This is not to say that the former Privacy 
Commissioner, quoted in the article, suggested that Facebook was in breach of Australian 
information privacy law and was actually bound by the Act. 
75  Facebook servers are located in the US and Sweden: Rob Waugh, ‘That’s Really Cool: 
Facebook Puts Your Photos Into the Deep Freeze as it Unveils Massive New Five Acre 
Data Centre Near Artic Circle’, Mail Online (online), 28 October 2011 
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2054168/Facebook-unveils-massive-data-
center-Lulea-Sweden.html>; Rich Miller, The Facebook Data Center FAQ (27 September 
2010) Data Center Knowledge <http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/the-facebook-
data-center-faq>. 
76  Privacy Act s 5B.  
77  Office of Australian Information Commissioner, Submission No 14 to House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs, Inquiry into 
Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Bill 2012, 24 July 2012, 15.  
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The Privacy Amendment Act makes some changes to the wording of the extra-
territorial provisions of the Privacy Act.78 Those changes do not, however, alter the 
wording of the two conditions described above, which must still be met before an 
organisation that is not incorporated in Australia will be considered to have an 
Australian link and be bound by the legislation in respect of acts and practices 
engaged in outside of Australia. Nevertheless, the Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Bill 2012 (Cth) (‘Explanatory 
Memorandum’) does seek to clarify that the requirement that information be 
collected in Australia ‘includes the collection of personal information from an 
individual who is physically within the borders of Australia or an external territory, 
by an overseas entity’79 and will also include information collected via a website 
hosted outside Australia and owned by a foreign company that is based outside of 
Australia and not incorporated within Australia.80 The Explanatory Memorandum 
also clarifies that those entities which ‘have an online presence (but no physical 
presence in Australia), and collect personal information from people who are 
physically in Australia, ‘carry on a business in Australia or an external Territory’.81  
Despite the clarification of the extra-territorial provisions offered in the Explanatory 
Memorandum the OAIC has suggested that the intended meaning of the requirement 
that information must be collected ‘in Australia’ should be made explicit by 
amending ‘in Australia’ to ‘from Australia’.82 This recommendation has not been 
incorporated into the wording of the legislation, which is unfortunate given the 
importance of those provisions in clarifying the entities subject to the Privacy Act and 
in respect of which the OAIC is able to take enforcement action.83  
Even so, the way in which the words ‘in Australia’, as used in the Australian link 
provisions of the amended Privacy Act, are to be interpreted is not the only ambiguity 
related to those provisions. Given that Facebook’s servers are all outside of 
Australia,84 it is clear that personal information is not held in Australia. What is less 
clear is whether Facebook can be said to collect information in Australia (or from 
                                                                
78  Privacy Amendment Act sch 4.  
79  Explanatory Memorandum, Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Bill 
2012 (Cth) 218.  
80  Ibid. 
81  Ibid. 
82  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission No 47 to Senate Standing 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Inquiry into the Privacy Amendment 
(Enhancing Privacy Protection) Bill 2012 (Cth) 23 July 2012, 17.  
83  Office of Australian Information Commissioner, above n 77, 15. 
84  Rob Waugh, above n 75; Rich Miller, above n 75. 
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people in Australia) within the meaning of the provisions. This is fundamental 
because the Facebook model necessitates the gathering, processing, holding, and 
storage of vast amounts of information, much of which may not have been requested 
by Facebook, but which has certainly been received by Facebook (via its users or 
applications developers and other third parties).85 Facebook also aggregates existing 
information and creates new information: for example, the summary information 
from which biometric templates are collated involves the aggregation and 
comparison of photographs in which individuals have been tagged. 86  Biometric 
templates (or face prints) themselves are information created by the organisation 
from other information in its possession. Whether all of these activities fall within the 
meaning of ‘collect’ in the Australian link provisions depends on how broadly the 
term is interpreted: does it include, for example, the gathering of information other 
than at the request of the organisation involved, and will it include information that 
is created or internally generated by the organisation and then included in a record 
or generally available publication?  
The word ‘collect’ is not currently defined in the Privacy Act but the Privacy 
Amendment Act inserts a definition of ‘collects’ into the Privacy Act to provide that ‘an 
entity collects personal information only if the entity collects information for 
inclusion in a record or generally available publication.’87 This definition limits the 
scope of ‘collect’, but the repetition of the verb also implies that it is not to be treated 
as synonymous with the inclusion of personal information in a record or generally 
available publication.88 This is probably due to the fact that the APPS (as with the 
current NPPs) are intended to apply both to the process of collecting information (for 
example, the requirement in APP 3 that information must be collected by lawful and 
fair means)89 as well as to the information itself once it has been retained.  90 However, 
the lack of any definition of ‘collect’ is problematic because it leaves open the 
question as to whether all personal information included in a record or generally 
available publication, howsoever an entity has come by that information, has been 
‘collected’ for the purpose of the Australian link provisions. 
                                                                
85  Facebook, Data Use Policy, above n 15.  
86  Facebook, Tagging Photos, above n 23 [What information does Facebook use to tell that a 
photo looks like me and to suggest that friends tag me]. 
87  Privacy Amendment Act sch 1 item 10.  
88  The Privacy Act distinguishes between the collection of personal information and 
information that has been collected, and this distinction is necessary because the NPPs 
relate both to the process of collection as well as the retention of information once 
collected: at s 16B and sch 3. 
89  Privacy Amendment Act sch 1 [APP 3]. 
90  Ibid sch 1 [APP 5]-[APP 13]. 
15
Bunn: Facebook and face recognition
Published by ePublications@bond, 2013
(2013) 25.1 BOND LAW REVIEW 
50 
B  Should ‘Collect’, as Used in the Australian Link Provisions, Have a Broad 
or Narrow Interpretation? 
There are a number of arguments supporting the proposition that the word ‘collect’, 
as used in the Australian link provisions of the Privacy Amendment Act, should be 
given a broad interpretation. That is, a broad interpretation of ‘collect’ would be the 
obtaining or creation of information – by whatever means, including internal 
generation - of personal information, which information is then included in a record 
or generally available publication, and the retention of personal information in a 
record or generally available publication.  
Part 2 of the APPs, encompassing APPs 3-6, is headed ‘Collection of Personal 
Information’. APP 3 relates to the collection of solicited personal information and 
applies to information that is both collected and solicited.91 The implication being that 
‘collect’ is the broader term. A number of the other APPs,92 as well as the body of the 
Act,93 refer to the collection of information but are not expressed to be limited to 
collection by solicitation. It seems clear, therefore, that the word ‘collect’ as used in 
the Privacy Amendment Act, including its use in the Australian link provisions, is not 
intended to be limited to solicitation of information. What is less clear is the question 
of whether an organisation can properly be regarded as collecting information where 
the information is not obtained from outside of the organisation, but is internally 
generated.  
In favour of an interpretation of ‘collect’ that would include the internal generation of 
information is the fact that the dictionary meaning of the verb collect includes 
bringing together, assembling or accumulating. 94  There is no reference in this 
definition to the object of the action and, thus, no suggestion as to how that object has 
                                                                
91  Ibid sch 1 [APP 3]. This wording seeks to clarify an ambiguity over the interpretation of 
the word ‘collect’ in the National Privacy Principles, namely whether the word ‘collect’ 
refers only to collection by solicitation or whether it refers to information received by an 
entity, regardless of whether or not that information had been requested: Graham 
Greenleaf, ‘Private Sector Privacy: Problems of Interpretation’ (Paper presented at The 
New Australian Privacy Landscape Seminar, University of New South Wales Faculty of 
Law, 14 March 2001) 3; cf Patrick Gunning, ‘Central Features of Australia’s Private Sector 
Privacy Law’ (2001) 7 Privacy Law and Policy Reporter 189, 193-195. Questions around 
interpretation of the word ‘collect’ have mostly arisen in connection with the use of the 
word in the NPPs of the Privacy Act. Similar debates have also taken place around the 
word collect as used in the information privacy legislation of other jurisdictions. 
92  Privacy Amendment Act sch 1 [APP 5] – [APP 6]. 
93  Ibid sch 1 item 16B. 
94  Oxford University Press, The Australian Concise Oxford Dictionary (3rd ed, 1997).  
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come into existence. What dictionary definitions of the word ‘collect’ do suggest, 
according to the New Zealand Law Commission, is that ‘collection involves making 
some effort to acquire something, and especially that to collect something is to 
acquire it or bring specimens of it together systematically or purposefully.’95 
Thus the natural and ordinary meaning of collect may be said to focus not on the 
object of the collection so much as the mental element of the collector: this 
interpretation is one which is supported by the definition of ‘collect’ as used in the 
recent amending legislation. It will be recalled that the Privacy Amendment Act 
provides that an entity collects personal information ‘only if the entity collects 
information for inclusion in a record or generally available publication.’96 As has been 
noted by Graham Greenleaf, the decision to retain personal information, even 
information which has not been requested, is what distinguishes the collection of 
information from mere receipt.97  
Therefore it is submitted that the key issue in deciding whether information has been 
collected within the meaning of the Australian link provisions (as well as the current 
organisational link provisions) will not be how the information was obtained, or 
whether it was internally generated or received from outside of the organisation in 
question, but whether or not the information was intended for inclusion or was 
included in a record or generally available publication.98  
It has been argued above that the use of the word ‘collect’ in the Australian link 
provisions to be inserted into the Privacy Act is capable of applying to the obtaining 
of personal information in Australia or (as per the clarification offered in the 
Explanatory Memorandum) from Australia, as well as to the creation of personal 
information about a person in Australia. However, this is not entirely beyond doubt: 
indeed, a consideration of the meaning of ‘collect’ within the context of information 
                                                                
95  New Zealand Law Commission, Review of the Privacy Act 1993, Issues Paper No 17, 79. 
96  Privacy Amendment Act sch 1 item 10.  
97  Graham Greenleaf, above n 91, 3. 
98  Against the above arguments is the fact that the Explanatory Memorandum explains that 
the words ‘in Australia’ as used in the Australian link provisions include collection ‘from 
an individual within Australia’: Explanatory Memorandum, Privacy Amendment 
(Enhancing Privacy Protection) Bill 2012 (Cth) 218 [emphasis added]. The use of the 
words ‘from an individual’ rather than, say, ‘about an individual’ would seem to imply 
active collection, rather than the mere receipt or creation of information about a person in 
Australia. That said, the Explanatory Memorandum does not specifically exclude 
collection about an individual from the meaning of ‘collect’. 
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privacy has also been undertaken in a number of other jurisdictions. 99  It is 
unfortunate, then, that the Privacy Act amending legislation does not more 
specifically define the term ‘collect’.100 One effect of this ambiguity is that the OAIC 
may be reluctant to take enforcement action against overseas organisations in respect 
of personal information about Australians where that personal information has been 
created by the organisation itself, rather than acquired by the organisation from the 
individual directly, or from a third party. Nevertheless, given that the Explanatory 
Memorandum explains that the extra-territorial provisions of the Privacy Act are 
intended to apply to organisations which collect information from Australia, even if 
they have no physical presence but only an online presence in the country, the 
Privacy Act will likely apply to at least some of the personal information that 
organisations such as Facebook include in their records. 
The next question must be, then, whether biometric templates, and the information 
from which they are created – namely photographs, associated information, such as 
tags and summary information − constitute personal information for the purposes of 
the Australian link provisions and the amended Privacy Act more generally.  
C  Do Biometric Templates, Photographs and Summary Information 
Constitute ‘Personal Information’ within the Meaning of the Amended 
Privacy Act 1988 (Cth)? 
The definition of ‘personal information’ which will be inserted into the Privacy Act 
when the amendments in the Privacy Amendment Act take effect is as follows: 
‘information or an opinion, whether true or not, and whether recorded in a material 
form or not, about an identified or reasonably identifiable individual’.101  
                                                                
99  See, eg, New Zealand Law Commission, above n 95, 76-82; Manitoba Government, 
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act Resource Manual, 2nd ed, 30 
<http://www.gov.mb.ca/chc/fippa/public_bodies/resource_manual/index.html>; Office of 
the Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data, Hong Kong, Data Protection Principles in the 
Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance: from the Privacy Commissioner’s perspective, 2nd ed, 16-23 
<http://www.pcpd.org.hk/tc_chi/publications/files/Perspective_2nd.pdf> 16-23; Office of 
the Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data (UK), ‘Installation of CCTV Systems in 
public places’, paper for Legislative Council Panel on Security, No. CB(2)1770/01-02(01), 3 
< http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr01-02/english/panels/se/papers/se0409cb2-1770-1e.pdf>.  
100  As noted below, this is unfortunate not only due to the lack of clarity as to the meaning of 
the term as used in Privacy Act s 5B, but also leads to some ambiguity as to the extent to 
which some of the APPs will apply where information is created or internally generated 
about individuals.  
101  Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy) Act 2012 (Cth) sch 1 item 36. 
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Under this definition, information can be personal information even where it does 
not identify a person per se, but where it can be combined with other information in 
the possession of the relevant entity to allow an individual to be identified.102 In 
relation to biometric templates created by Facebook, these will be likely to constitute 
‘personal information’ in the hands of the organisation because they are linked to a 
user’s account and are therefore ‘about an identified or reasonably identifiable 
individual’. Although it is possible that the template will be incorrectly linked to an 
individual account, 103  this will not prevent the template from being considered 
‘personal information’ because the definition encompasses information and opinions, 
whether true or not.104 
To create a face print, Facebook needs to compile and use summary information, 
involving comparisons of photographs and associated data relating to the person 
about whom the template is to be created.105 It has been estimated that Facebook 
holds around 60 billion photographs which have been uploaded by users.106 These 
photographs may depict the user him/herself and other users of Facebook, as well as 
people – including children – who do not have an account with Facebook. Whether 
these photographs in and of themselves constitute ‘personal information’ within the 
meaning of the new definition of that term will depend on whether the person in the 
photograph is identified, or reasonably identifiable.  
As the latest amendments to the Privacy Act have only recently been passed, no 
guidance has yet been provided by the OAIC on the application of this definition to 
images. In general, however, the Government has indicated a need for more detailed 
                                                                
102  This overcomes a limitation inherent in the current Privacy Act whereby the definition of 
personal information is ‘information… about an individual whose identity is apparent, or 
can reasonably be ascertained, from the information or opinion’: at s 6(1) [emphasis 
added]. This arguably excludes from the meaning of personal information, information 
such as biometric templates which, being algorithms, can only identify an individual if 
the algorithm is linked with other data that identifies the individual and cannot identify 
an individual from the information in and of itself: see ALRC Report, above n 7, vol 1, 307 
[6.55], 309 [Recommendation 6.1]. 
103  Stephen Wilson writes that ‘[b]ecause biometrics are fuzzy, we can regard a biometric 
identification as a sort of opinion’: Stephen Wilson, The Fundamental Privacy Challenges in 
Biometrics (20 October 2012) Lockstep Blog <http://lockstep.com.au/blog/2012/10/20/ 
biometrics-and-privacy-basics>. 
104  Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy) Act 2012 (Cth) sch 1 item 36. 
105  Facebook, Tagging Photos, above n 23. 
106  EPIC, above n 17, 1. Although, according to the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Facebook 
refuses to reveal the actual number of photographs that it holds in its database. 
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guidance from the OAIC as to the meaning of the term ‘personal information.’107 As 
to the application of the current definition of ‘personal information’108 to images, the 
OAIC has only restated the provisions of the Act and advised that ‘images of persons 
in photographs and films are treated as personal information under the [Privacy] Act 
where the person’s identity is clear or can be reasonably worked out from that 
image.’109 More detailed guidance on the application of the current definition to 
images is provided by state-based Privacy Commissions, such as the Office of the 
Victorian Privacy Commissioner, which notes that it in determining whether an 
image constitutes personal information, it is necessary to take into account a number 
of factors, such as the clarity of the image and the context.110 This is likely to remain 
the case under the new definition of personal information.  
In terms of whether photographs on Facebook constitute personal information, this 
will depend on the photograph itself and associated data (such as tags or GPS 
location coordinates). If a Facebook user is tagged by another user in a photograph, 
the photograph will be ‘personal information’ within the meaning of the Act because 
tags relating to other users are always associated with that user’s account and are 
therefore information about an identified or reasonably identifiable individual. 111 
However, where a photograph is tagged with the name of a person who is not a 
registered Facebook user, the image may still be considered personal information 
because the name – attached to the image – identifies an individual. Where a 
photograph of a person who is not a registered user of Facebook is incorrectly 
                                                                
107  Explanatory Memorandum, Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Bill 
2012 (Cth), 61. 
108  Privacy Act s 6(1) currently defines personal information as: ‘information or an opinion 
(including information or an opinion forming part of a database), whether true or not, 
and whether recorded in a material form or not, about an individual whose identity is 
apparent, or can reasonably be ascertained, from the information or opinion.’ 
109  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, What Do I Need to Think About if I 
Want to Put Photos on the Web? <http://www.privacy.gov.au/faq/business/gen-q5>.  
110  Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, Images and Privacy Information Sheet 01.03 
(31 January 2003) <http://www.privacy.vic.gov.au/domino/privacyvic/web2.nsf/files/ 
images-and-privacy/$file/info_sheet_01_03.pdf>.  
111  Facebook, Tagging Photos, above n 23. Note that even if the tag does not correctly identify 
a person in a photograph by name, the photograph is still likely to be considered as 
personal information because the information does not need to be true: Privacy 
Amendment (Enhancing Privacy) Act 2012 (Cth) sch 1 item 36.  
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tagged, it is possible that the photograph will not be considered personal information 
because it is not about an identified or reasonably identifiable person.112  
Where a person in an image is not named by the addition of a tag, then the image 
will not be treated as personal information in the hands of Facebook, unless the 
person is reasonably identifiable by that organisation. If a biometric template of that 
person is stored in the Facebook database, however, then the person will be 
identified or reasonably identifiable by virtue of the face recognition software: indeed 
the whole purpose of the tag suggest feature is to identify people in images before 
tags are added.  
Therefore, an image may be considered personal information, depending on what it 
reveals and whether a person in the image is named or otherwise identifiable, 
whereas a biometric face print in the hands of Facebook will always be personal 
information under the new definition of that term. Summary information from which 
a template is created will also be considered personal information under the new 
definition as it is linked to a particular user.113  
Reference needs also to be made to the fact that the definition of personal information 
requires information to be ‘about’ an individual. It has been said that biometric 
templates are not so much information about a person as information of and intrinsic 
to a person. 114  The ALRC discussed the interpretation of the words ‘about an 
individual’ and whether they should be amended to ‘relate to an individual’ – 
deciding against that change.115 Although the question of whether information can 
properly be said to be about an individual will sometimes not be straightforward,116 it 
would seem that information can be ‘about’ an individual where it either identifies 
the individual or can be linked to other information identifying the individual.117 
                                                                
112  Although if Facebook does create biometric templates or hold summary information 
about people who are not Facebook users then this position may be different as the 
person may be identifiable by comparison of the image in question with the template or 
summary information.  
113  Facebook, Tagging Photos, above n 23. As is the case with biometric templates, summary 
information may not be considered personal information under the current definition in 
the Privacy Act if identification of an individual is not possible from the information itself. 
114  Roger Clarke, Biometrics and Privacy (15 April 2001) <http://www.rogerclarke.com/ 
DV/Biometrics.html#Thr>. 
115  ALRC Report, above n 6, vol 1, 306 [6.51].  
116  See, eg, ibid vol 1, 304 [6.40]-[6.43]. 
117  Ibid vol 1, 298 [6.18] referring to a discussion of the term ‘about an individual’ in a report 
prepared in 2004. 
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D  Do Photographs, Summary Information and Biometric Templates 
Constitute ‘Sensitive Information’ within the Meaning of the Amended 
Privacy Act 1988 (Cth)? 
Under the Privacy Act, certain types of personal information are classed as ‘sensitive 
information’ and the new APPs include more stringent requirements around the 
collection, storage and use of that information, to reflect its nature.118 The ALRC gave 
consideration, in its 2008 report, to whether biometric information should be 
regarded as sensitive information and recommended that the definition of sensitive 
information be amended to include ‘biometric information collected for use in 
automated biometric verification and identification systems and biometric template 
information.’ The Privacy Amendment Act adopts this recommendation.119 
What is meant by ‘automated biometric verification and identification’ is not clarified 
in the amending legislation, nor in the Explanatory Memorandum. In making 
recommendations for the inclusion of biometric templates and certain biometric 
information in the definition of sensitive information, the ALRC also did not offer 
any definition of ‘automated biometric verification’.120 Whilst the ALRC refers to a 
number of automated biometric identification systems, such as the use of a biometric 
template in a passport or to access an Automated Teller Machine, a building or a 
computer system,121 there is no discussion of the use of biometrics in relation to social 
networking, and no consideration of the fact that a template may be used for a 
purpose such as ‘tag suggest’. On the other hand, it seems quite clear that the tag 
suggest feature is a form of automated biometric identification: it is difficult to 
describe it as anything else. Accordingly, any biometric templates held by Facebook 
will be considered sensitive information when the new definition comes into force.  
More difficulty exists around the question of the extent to which a photograph 
constitutes sensitive information. A photograph may be considered sensitive 
information depending on the information revealed by the image itself and any 
associated metadata122 – for example, a photograph of two same sex individuals 
                                                                
118  Privacy Act sch 3 [NPP 10]. 
119  Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy) Act 2012 (Cth) sch 1 item 42.  
120  ALRC Report, above n 6, vol 1, 324 [6.119] and 326 [Recommendation 6-4].  
121  ALRC Report, above n 6, vol 1, 406 [9.64].  
122  See, eg, Facebook’s Data Use Policy in which it is noted that ‘[w]hen you post things like 
photos or videos on Facebook, we may receive additional related data (or metadata), such 
as the time, date, and place you took the photo or video’: Facebook, Data Use Policy, 
above n 15.  
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kissing each other could be considered sensitive information because it reveals 
information about an identified individual’s sexual orientation.123  
However, photographs are also a form of biometric information.124 Therefore, when 
the Privacy Act amendments to the definition of sensitive information come into effect 
in March 2014, photographs and summary information which are used to create a 
biometric template will probably be regarded as sensitive information, given that 
they are collected for the purpose of automated biometric identification.125 It is also 
possible that, when the tag suggest feature becomes available to users again, all 
photographs which inspire an automatic tag suggestion will be considered sensitive 
information.  
The extent to which the APPs may present compliance risks for Facebook is now 
considered, with particular focus on the principles set out in Pt 2 of the Act, namely 
those relating to the collection and receipt of information, including sensitive 
information. This discussion is predicated on the assumption that the amended 
Privacy Act could apply to Facebook’s activities of collecting, receiving and creating 
personal information from Australia.  
                                                                
123  The Privacy Amendment Act amends the definition of ‘sensitive information’ in the Privacy 
Act to include information about an individual’s ‘sexual orientation’ (as opposed to 
‘sexual preferences’): at sch 1 item 41.  
124  ALRC Report, above n 6, vol 1, 323 [6.115]. ‘Biometric information’ is not defined in the 
Act but the Explanatory Memorandum notes that the amendment to the definition of 
sensitive information is to implement ALRC recommendations and the Explanatory 
Memorandum also notes the broad reach of what is capable of being considered 
biometric information: Explanatory Memorandum, Privacy Amendment (Enhancing 
Privacy) Bill 2012 (Cth) 62, Item 42.   
125  The term ‘automated biometric identification’ is not defined in the Privacy Amendment 
Act, nor in the Explanatory Memorandum, although the Explanatory Memorandum notes 
that amended definition of sensitive information is designed to reflect the ALRC’s 
recommendations in relation to biometric information and templates: Explanatory 
Memorandum, Privacy Amendments (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Bill 2012 (Cth) 62, 
Item 42. The ALRC notes that biometric information should be classed as sensitive 
information when it is collected for use in automated systems and that this protection is 
necessary ‘to address the most serious concerns around biometric information, for 
example, that such information may be used to identify individuals without their 
knowledge or consent’: ALRC, above n 6, vol 1, 325 [6.120]. 
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E  Collection and Receipt of Personal Information, Including Sensitive 
Information 
The new APPs contain a principle relating to the collection of personal information.126 
The collection principle under the APPs only relates to information that has been 
collected and solicited.127  As discussed above, there is some ambiguity over the 
meaning of the term ‘collect’ as used in the Act, but the term ‘solicit’ is defined as 
follows: 
an entity solicits personal information if the entity requests another entity to 
provide the personal information, or to provide a kind of information in which 
that personal information is included.128 
The words ‘or to provide a kind of information in which that information is included’ 
are key here as they suggest that information can be solicited even when that 
information is not specifically requested, but where it is received as part of a general 
request for the provision of information, which will include personal information.129  
It is, therefore, possible that Facebook would be deemed to collect and solicit 
personal information in the form of photographs, and tags or other information (such 
as GPS coordinates) added to or embedded within photographs. This is because, 
even if Facebook has not actively requested any particular piece of information, the 
Facebook model itself is premised upon the sharing of personal information by users 
about themselves and others. Facebook’s stated mission is ‘to make the world more 
                                                                
126  Privacy Act sch 3 [NPP 1]; Privacy Amendment Act sch 1 [APP 3]. Under the NPPs it is not 
clear whether this applies to information that has not been solicited (refer to the 
discussion earlier in this article). Under the APPs, however, unsolicited information is 
specifically covered and retention of personal information that has not been solicited is 
only permitted if the organisation could have collected it in accordance with the 
information collection principle or where it is unlawful or unreasonable to de-identify it 
or destroy it: Privacy Amendment Act sch 1 [APP 4]. 
127  Privacy Amendment Act sch 1 [APP 3.7]. 
128  Privacy Amendment Act sch 1 item 44. 
129  While on the one hand a decision of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal, referred to by 
the NSW Law Reform Commission (NSWLRC), suggests that virtually all complaints 
received by investigative agencies will be considered to be unsolicited for the purposes of 
privacy legislation, the NSWLRC nevertheless refers to conflicting advice issued by 
Privacy NSW to the effect that agencies holding themselves out as being the appropriate 
body to receive complaints should not treat complaints received as unsolicited: see 
NSWLRC, Privacy Legislation in New South Wales, Consultation Paper No 3 (2008), 87 
[5.58].  
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open and connected’ 130  and it has been noted that ‘Facebook’s business model 
depends on the promiscuity of its members.’131 Indeed, in some cases Facebook has 
actively encouraged users to share information about others, such as by providing 
the tag suggest feature for users.132  
It seems clear that the creation of biometric templates will not fall within the 
collection principle given that templates are not in any sense solicited, but are created 
by Facebook from other information in their possession.133 To adopt the words of the 
ALRC, Facebook has ‘done nothing to cause the information to be sent to it.’ 134 
Accordingly, the creation of biometric templates, as well as summary information, 
will not be considered under the collection principle, but may fall to be considered as 
unsolicited information which is received by an APP Entity: this is discussed further 
below.  
Although an organisation does not ordinarily require the consent of the individual to 
whom the personal information relates before collection occurs, the collection should 
be reasonably necessary for one or more of the organisation’s functions or 
purposes.135 Facebook could almost certainly argue that the collection of photographs 
and associated information (such as tags) of users and non-users alike is necessary, 
given that the sharing of personal information by members about themselves is the 
very reason users open a Facebook account.  
It will be recalled that photographs and associated information (such as tags) may be 
treated as sensitive information in some cases, and will be regarded as sensitive 
information when used in connection with automated biometric identification. In 
relation to the collection of sensitive information, compliance with the APPs requires 
Facebook to have the consent of those to whom the information relates. 136  The 
                                                                
130  Facebook, Product/Service <www.facebook.com/facebook>.  
131  Johnston and Wilson, above n 61, 63.  
132  EPIC, above n 17, 19, 25. However, note that the Facebook Terms of Use specifically 
require users to refrain from tagging others without having first received consent to do 
so: Facebook, Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, above n 15; Facebook, Data Use Policy, 
above n 15. 
133  By analogy, Privacy NSW has, according to the NSWLRC, been warning agencies against 
treating complaints made to them as unsolicited, where the agency has held themselves 
out as being the appropriate point of contact for complaints: NSWLRC, above n 129, 5 
[5.58]. 
134  ALRC Report, above n 6, vol 1, 725 [21.51]. 
135  Privacy Amendment Act sch 1 [APP 3]. 
136  Ibid sch 1; Privacy Act sch 3 [NPP 1]. [APP 3]. However, when the new APPs come into 
effect and in the event that information is unsolicited and consent to the receipt of the 
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question of whether Facebook users have consented to the collection of sensitive 
personal information is a complex one, the answer to which depends on the nature of 
the sensitive information in question as well as the construction and application of 
Facebook Terms of Use to information.  
Although Facebook users, when opening an account, agree to be bound by 
Facebook’s terms and the Data Use Policy, and although agreement to these terms is 
possibly sufficient to constitute consent to the collection and use of sensitive 
information, such as photographs, there are still questions around whether that 
consent is effective for ensuring compliance with the amended Privacy Act.137 The 
Privacy Act currently defines consent to include express or implied consent and this 
definition remains unchanged by the new legislation. As noted by the ALRC, the 
meaning of consent as used in the Privacy Act does not disturb the requisite general 
law elements of consent: namely that consent must be given voluntarily, and the 
person providing the consent must have the capacity to understand and 
communicate their consent.138 In determining whether consent has been provided 
voluntarily, the ALRC notes that this will depend, inter alia, on whether an 
individual has a clear option not to consent, and whether the consent is given 
specifically and not bundled with other purposes.139 
                                                                                                                                                                       
information is not obtained, the organisation may still be able to hold the information 
without de-identifying it, although the information must then be dealt with in accordance 
with the remaining privacy principles: Privacy Amendment Act sch 1 [APP 4]. 
137  The Privacy Act currently defines consent as including express or implied consent: at s 6. 
This definition remains unchanged by the Privacy Amendment Act. As noted by the ALRC, 
the meaning of consent as used in the Privacy Act does not disturb the requisite general 
law elements of consent: namely that consent must be given voluntarily, and the person 
providing the consent must have the capacity to understand and communicate their 
consent: ALRC Report, above n 7, vol 1, 669 [19.9]. In determining whether consent has 
been provided voluntarily, the ALRC notes that this will depend, inter alia, on whether 
an individual has a clear option not to consent, and whether the consent is given 
specifically and not bundled with other purposes:  vol 1, 669 [19.10]. At the initial stage of 
opening a new account with Facebook users are informed as follows: ‘[b]y clicking Sign 
Up you agree to our terms and that you have read our Data Use Policy, including our 
Cookie Use.’ Facebook <https://www.facebook.com> [emphasis added]. Later in the sign-
up process new Facebook users do indicate their agreement to the Data Use Policy: 
Europe v Facebook, Legal Procedure against “Facebook Ireland Limited”, Complaint No 8, 
Attachment 8  <http://www.europe-v-facebook.org/EN/Complaints/complaints.html>.  
138  ALRC Report, above n 6, vol 1, 669 [19.9]. 
139  Ibid vol 1, 669 [19.10]. 
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In the context of complaints made about Facebook to the Irish DPC, it has been 
argued that the means of gaining user consent to the provisions of the data use policy 
is deliberately ambiguous. This is said to be the case because users indicate consent to 
the Data Use Policy indirectly (by entering a code given as part of the security check 
process on signing up). 140  Arguably consent to the Data Use Policy is therefore 
bundled with other purposes (the security check) and the other purposes take 
prominence over the consent.141 If this is so then users may not be considered to have 
effectively consented to the collection and use of their sensitive information for the 
purpose of ensuring compliance with the data collection principle.  
In relation to sensitive information about those who are not registered users of 
Facebook, the consent of those individuals has clearly been neither sought nor given. 
Although the Facebook terms are available to non-users and are stated to apply to 
users and ‘others who interact with Facebook’ they are unlikely to apply to those 
who have not registered with the site (or who have not otherwise entered into a 
contract with Facebook). Even if a person who is not a registered Facebook user does 
interact with the Facebook site,142 the Terms of Use are not specifically drawn to their 
attention as a condition of using the site and they are not required to indicate consent 
to those terms in any way. Of course, many individuals who have photographs or 
other personal information about them posted on Facebook will not interact with 
Facebook and may not be aware of the existence of their information on the site. It 
must also be remembered that many of those whose photographs and other personal 
information are posted on Facebook will also be minors who might not be considered 
to possess sufficient capacity for giving consent in any event.143 Indeed, one aspect of 
EPIC’s complaint to the US Federal Trade Commission was that Facebook users are 
encouraged to tag a child in photographs, even if that child is not a Facebook 
                                                                
140  Europe v Facebook, above n 137, Complaint no 8, 4 and Attachment 8. In the Irish DPC’s 
audit of Facebook, the office did not make any specific findings as to whether the Data 
Use Policy was sufficient for the purpose of obtaining users’ consent to the collection of 
their information per se. However, the office did recommend that the Data Use Policy be 
made more accessible and given greater prominence during the registration process: Data 
Protection Commissioner (Ireland), above n 25, 5. The office also noted that ‘reliance 
upon the Facebook Data Use Policy as the sole means for capturing user consent for the 
use of their information may not always be considered acceptable…for all possible uses 
of data’: at 14. 
141  Europe v Facebook, above n 137, Complaint no 8, attachment 8(b).  
142  As is possible when a non-registered person visits a corporate page on Facebook.  
143  See generally ALRC Report, above n 6, vol 3, Chapter 68 [Decision Making by and for 
Individuals Under the Age of 18]. 
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member. 144  Accordingly, if sensitive information in the form of photographs or 
associated information about individuals who are not registered users of Facebook is 
considered to be collected and solicited by Facebook, the organisation will not be in 
compliance with the new data collection principle.  
Although it has been submitted here that photographs and associated information 
such as tags might be considered to be personal information that has been collected 
and solicited by Facebook, this is not beyond doubt. If such information is not 
considered to be solicited, it will fall to be considered under the principle relating to 
receipt of unsolicited information. 145  Assuming that photographs and associated 
information fall within the receipt of unsolicited information principle, one 
consequence is that Facebook may be able to retain and use even sensitive personal 
information about individuals who are not registered Facebook users, even where 
those users have not consented to the retention of that information. This is because, 
although the receipt principle requires an entity to destroy or de-identify information 
which it could not have collected in accordance with the collection principle (APP 3), 
an exception to that requirement is where it would not be lawful or reasonable to 
destroy or de-identify the information in question.146 As noted above, in accordance 
with the collection principle (APP 3), those who are not registered users of Facebook 
have not consented to the collection of sensitive information (which may include 
photographs and other associated information, such as tags or geolocation data). 
However, Facebook may be able to mount an argument that the destruction or de-
identification of that information, even so, would be unreasonable. Although 
Facebook has the right to remove any content which violates its terms or policies 
(and one of those terms is that users have obtained consent to the collection of 
information from others147) this does not amount to an obligation to remove such 
content.148  Facebook may be able to argue that removal of material in this way 
constitutes an unjustified interference with a Facebook user’s freedom of 
expression,149 and would also be technically difficult and expensive to police.150  
                                                                
144  EPIC, above n 17, 25. According to EPIC, Facebook also has a large number of registered 
users who are under the age of 13: at 24. 
145  Privacy Amendment Act sch 1 [APP 4]. 
146  Ibid. 
147  Facebook, Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, above n 15, term 2.  
148  See, eg, Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNET Limited (No 3) [2010] FCA 24, [427]. 
149  In Australia there is no general right to freedom of expression, though freedom of 
communication on government and political matters is recognised as being implied 
under the Constitution of Australia: Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 
CLR 520. However, Australia has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and art 19(2) provides that everyone shall have the right to freedom of 
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In relation to summary information and biometric templates (face prints), these are 
certainly unsolicited information but there is doubt about whether the information 
can be said to have been ‘received’, given that it is not obtained from a third party.151 
Although the word ‘received’ is not defined in the amended Privacy Act it can be 
defined to include acquisition (of something).152 In line with the dictionary definition 
of ‘receive’, information created by an organisation will have been acquired, and thus 
received, by the organisation. On the other hand the wording of this principle does 
not easily apply to information that is internally generated: indeed it would make 
little sense for an organisation to create personal information before making a 
decision as to whether or not it was entitled to retain it.  
Conversely, taking into consideration that one of the stated objects of the Privacy Act, 
as inserted by the recent amending legislation, is to promote the protection of the 
privacy of individuals, 153  the principle relating to the receipt of unsolicited 
information should probably be interpreted broadly to include within the meaning of 
‘receipt’ internally generated information. Certainly the ALRC, in recommending 
changes to the Privacy Act, intended that information obtained by surveillance and 
                                                                                                                                                                       
expression. This right, in turn, may be subject to lawful restrictions to protect, inter alia, 
the rights and reputations of others (art 19(3)): International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, 16 December 1966, [1980] ATS 23 (entered into force on 23 March 1976). 
150  In Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Ltd [2012] HCA 16, the High Court considered, inter alia, 
what constituted ‘reasonable steps’ on the part of an Internet Service Provider (ISP) to 
prevent or avoid copyright infringements on the part of its users. Although the 
circumstances of an ISP are quite different from those of a site host with the contractual 
ability to remove content, and although the iiNET case related to allegations of copyright 
infringement and not to the Privacy Act, comments made in that judgment are 
nevertheless insightful and reveal that practical considerations relating to the nature of 
the internet were taken into account in considering what is ‘reasonable’: see, eg, [138] 
(French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ) noting that ‘iiNET had many thousands of account 
holders. Was it a reasonable step to require of iiNET that it monitor continually the 
activities of IP addresses?’  
151  The word ‘receive’ is not defined in the Act but could be interpreted as being limited to 
information that comes into the possession of an entity from another party, rather than 
including information that is ‘created’ or generated by the entity itself. The receipt 
principle was inserted following the ALRC’s recommendation to this effect and to deal 
with the problem they saw that related to the fact that entities often received information 
from others without having taken any active steps to collect the information. ALRC 
Report, above n 7, vol 1, 720 [21.36].  
152  Concise Oxford Dictionary, above n 94. 
153  Privacy Amendment Act sch 4 item 2A. 
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other means should be included within the collection principle. 154  Given that 
information obtained by surveillance cannot be considered to have been ‘solicited’ it 
will only be caught by principles relating to collection by virtue of falling within the 
receipt of unsolicited information principle.155 
Assuming, then, that the principle relating to the receipt of unsolicited information 
will apply to information that has been internally generated, sensitive information – 
such as biometric templates and summary information – that has been created 
without the permission of the person to whom it relates will have to be destroyed or 
de-identified unless it is not lawful or reasonable to do so. In relation to biometric 
templates, users may be said to have consented to the creation of these if they have 
actively enabled the tag suggest feature. Where the tag suggest feature is enabled as a 
default setting, however, the position is less clear. In relation to the creation of 
summary information, it will be recalled that this information exists unless and until 
users remove any tags from photographs of themselves posted to Facebook. There is 
no opportunity for users to prevent themselves being tagged in photographs. 
Whether inaction - a failure to remove tags - is sufficient to constitute consent must 
be doubtful. Assuming that a Facebook user does not consent to the creation of a 
biometric template about himself or herself, nor to the creation of summary 
information, is it reasonable for Facebook to destroy or de-identify the information? 
Facebook could argue it is not reasonable to do so, in that the information enables the 
site to provide important features (such as tag suggest) to its users and that users 
have the ability to self-police and ensure the removal of this information should they 
so wish.156 
It is not clear whether Facebook creates biometric templates or summary information 
about those who are not registered users of Facebook – though this has been 
alleged.157 If it does, it would be more difficult for Facebook to argue that it is 
unreasonable to destroy or de-identify this information: the information does not 
appear on a user’s page, so there can be no argument that it interferes with freedom 
of expression or ‘consumer choice’. Equally, the information is not used to provide 
services to Facebook users; and those who are not registered users of Facebook have 
no ability to control whether or not this information is created. Accordingly, if the 
creation of biometric templates and the internal generation of other information 
about those who are not registered users of Facebook is regarded as being the 
                                                                
154  ALRC Report, above n 7, vol 1, 732 [21.81].  
155  Privacy Amendment Act sch 1 [APP 4].  
156  Data Protection Commissioner (Ireland), above n 25, 47-48. 
157  Lynch, above n 1, 2. 
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‘receipt’ of information under the APPs, it is also likely that the retention of this 
information would be a breach of the APPs.  
There are a number of other privacy principles which apply to the collection, use and 
disclosure of personal information and which may present compliance risks for 
Facebook. A consideration of each of those principles is beyond the scope of this 
article. However, of note is a requirement in the new APPs for an entity’s privacy 
policy to contain information regarding how complaints about a breach of the APPs 
(or a registered privacy code) should be made and how such complaints will be dealt 
with.158 Facebook’s privacy code (also referred to as the Data Use Policy) does inform 
users of the place to which complaints concerning the data use policy should be 
addressed, but there is no information in the code about how complaints are dealt 
with. In addition, if the new principles are interpreted so as to impose a requirement 
that an entity make specific reference to the APPs in its privacy code, this could 
prove problematic for organisations, such as Facebook, which have a generic privacy 
code for users in various jurisdictions all over the world.  
IV  Facebook: Compliance or Complacency? 
Despite the ambiguities around the scope of the application of the amended Privacy 
Act, this article has highlighted a number of compliance risks that may apply to 
Facebook in relation to its collection or creation of photographs, summary 
information and biometric face prints. 159  One of the most significant risks for 
Facebook in terms of compliance with Australian information privacy laws concerns 
its collection (or creation) of sensitive information, particularly where this 
information relates to individuals who are not Facebook users and who cannot be 
said to have consented to the collection or use of this information. Although it is not 
clear whether Facebook has ever created (or ever will create) biometric templates of 
individuals who are not registered Facebook users, the organisation is in possession 
of vast amounts of information about individuals who may never have interacted 
with the site: this includes photographs and associated information, and possibly 
summary information. Some of this information will, in turn, be sensitive 
information: such as where a photograph reveals particular information about an 
identifiable individual, or where summary information is to be used for creating a 
biometric template. Compliance risks for the organisation also relate to the creation 
of summary information and face prints of its own users, at least while there exist 
                                                                
158  Privacy Amendment Act sch 1 [APP 1.4], [APP 5.2].  
159  In addition to those APPs that are considered, there are a number of other APPs that 
apply to personal information and sensitive information but which are not discussed in 
this paper: Privacy Amendment Act sch 1. 
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ongoing questions as to whether those users can be said to have properly consented 
to the creation of that information. This may be a particular risk where (despite the 
Facebook Data Use Policy) features are enabled as a default setting (for example, 
where tag suggest is enabled as a default setting, requiring users to opt-out rather 
than opt-in) or where users have no ability to opt-out of a feature (for example, users 
are unable to opt-out of manual tagging of themselves by others.)160  
Even to the extent that the Privacy Act might not have direct application to certain 
practices of Facebook, the APPs nevertheless provide a benchmark by which any 
organisation’s practices can be measured. Indeed, the Irish DPC reported on 
Facebook’s practices not in terms of whether or not they contravened the Irish Data 
Protection laws, but rather to the extent that they represented or fell short of best 
practice.161 Facebook has also shown itself to be responsive to public sentiment in 
relation to user control of information,162 and its decision to disable the tag suggest 
feature in the US – although explained by the organisation as an opportunity to 
enhance efficiency of the tool163 – could also be seen as a response to privacy concerns 
raised in relation to the technology. What is more, it does seem likely that as and 
when the tag suggest feature is re-introduced, at least for users outside of the US, it 
will allow users to opt-in rather than require them to opt-out.164  
Even so, significant concerns must remain for those who are not registered users of 
Facebook and whose personal information is posted and possibly used without their 
consent, or even knowledge. Concerns must also remain about the use of face 
recognition technology generally, particularly in the private sphere. This is so even 
where consent to creation of biometric templates and summary information is given. 
Questions as to security of the information, the way in which it is used, and the 
potential applications of the technology and the massive databases of personal 
information it generates must continue to be asked.  
Furthermore, the Australian Privacy Act should be considered, at best, a blunt 
instrument by which to enhance the level of control that individuals have over their 
                                                                
160  Facebook, Tagging Photos above n 23; Data Protection Commissioner (Ireland), above n 25, 
48. 
161  Data Protection Commissioner (Ireland), above n 25, 3. 
162  See, eg, ‘Facebook Backs Down, Reverses on User Information Policy’, CNN (online), 18 
February 2009 <http://edition.cnn.com/2009/TECH/02/18/facebook.reversal/index.html>.  
163  Above p 3 and n 14. 
164  Anita Ramasastry, ‘The Right to be Untagged: As Facebook Disables Facial Recognition 
for EU Consumers, US Consumers are Left Wondering What’s Next for Them’, Verdict 
(online), 25 September 2012, <http://verdict.justia.com/2012/09/25/the-right-to-be-
untagged>. 
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personal information. Individuals who are concerned about possible non-compliance 
with Australian’s information privacy laws do not have standing to bring legal 
action for breach of those principles. 165  Instead users must address unresolved 
complaints to the OAIC who may decide to investigate them. There is also the 
problem of enforcement. Under the newly amended Privacy Act, the Commissioner 
will have the power to make a number of orders against agencies and organisations 
who are found not to have complied with the privacy principles, including a civil 
penalty order up to a maximum of $1.1 million in relation to serious and repeated 
interference with the privacy of an individual. 166  Timothy Pilgrim, the current 
Australian Privacy Commissioner, has been quoted as saying that ‘fines will send a 
clear message that the community expects better legal protection.’167  
Whether the imposition of fines will be anything more than a message about what 
the community expects must be questionable given the significant challenges 
involved in trying to enforce Australian laws against an organisation that is not 
incorporated in Australia and has no presence here.168 Moreover, while Facebook has 
previously shown itself to be susceptible to public pressure in relation to decisions 
perceived as impinging on individual control of their information,169 it is increasingly 
                                                                
165  Recommendations made by the ALRC for the introduction of a cause of action for serious 
invasion of privacy are still some way off from being implemented: ALRC, above n 7, vol 
3, 2584-2585. As to the status of these recommendations, see Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet, Privacy Reforms, Australian Government <http://www.dpmc. 
gov.au/privacy/reforms.cfm>. Even if the ALRC’s recommendations are implemented an 
action for invasion of privacy will only lie if a person shows they had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, and that the act or conduct complained of is highly offensive to a 
reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. 
166  Privacy Amendment Act sch 4 item 50; Explanatory Memorandum, Privacy Amendments 
(Enhancing Privacy Protection) Bill 2012 (Cth) 62, 226-227. 
167  Andrew Colley, ‘Big Firms Face Fines and Hefty Sanctions Over Privacy Breaches’, The 
Australian (online), 3 July 2012 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/australian-it/it-
business/big-firms-face-fines-and-hefty-sanctions-over-privacy-breaches/story-e6frganx-
1226415040657>. 
168  A consideration of cross-border enforcement issues and challenges is beyond the scope of 
this paper, but see generally Dan Svantesson, ‘Protecting Privacy on the “Borderless” 
Internet – Some Thoughts on Extraterritoriality and Transborder Data Flow’ (2007) 19(1) 
Bond Law Review 168. See also OAIC, Submission no 16 to Senate Standing Committee on 
Environment, Communications and the Arts, Parliament of Australia, The Adequacy of 
Protections for the Privacy of Australians Online, August 2010, 19-21. 
169  As at December 2011, Facebook had 845 million monthly active users: Facebook Inc., 
‘Prospectus: Subject to Completion’, Registration Statement under the Securities Act 1933 
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subject to countervailing pressures brought to bear by other stakeholders, notably its 
investors and advertising partners. 170  What is more, the extent to which public 
disapproval of Facebook’s practices poses any real threat to the organisation may 
decrease in direct proportion to the growth in size of the Facebook community: the 
more people use Facebook to connect with each other, the more they are likely to feel 
that there is no ‘viable and popular alternative’ to the site. 171  Perhaps, as one 
commentator has suggested, Australians are prepared to trade privacy with free 
services, this trade being ‘the Faustian pact into which we have entered in order to 
survive in this age of constant connectivity, where the tentacles of Facebook … are 
extending to every corner of the internet ’.172  
As noted by the ALRC in its 2008 report, ‘effective law reform must respond not only 
to current problems and gaps in the law, but also anticipate where there are likely to 
be significant problems in the future that will require some kind of regulation.’173 It is 
unfortunate then that, in the era of Web 2.0 and the growth of social media platforms 
which are often owned and operated from outside of Australia, amendments to the 
Privacy Act still do not adequately clarify the threshold issue of the extent to which 
the Act regulates the practices of overseas organisations. Even if the Privacy Act does 
apply to acts and practices of an organisation in relation to information (such as 
summary information and biometric templates) that is internally generated by an 
organisation outside of Australia, the extent to which the collection and receipt 
principles in the APPs (namely APP 3 and APP 4) apply to that type of information is 
unclear. Whilst the recent amendments to the Privacy Act were intended to preserve 
the principle of technological neutrality,174 the ALRC has also noted the importance 
of legislation that is technologically aware.175 Unfortunately there are a number of 
respects in which the legislation appears to be technologically blind, particularly in 
so far as little or no proper consideration has been given to ensuring that 
fundamental definitions, such as the definition of ‘collect’, do not exclude certain 
means of information acquisition.  
                                                                                                                                                                       
(Form S-1), 1 February 2012, <http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/0001 
19312512034517/d287954ds1.htm>. 
170  See, eg, Chander, above n 19, 1841; Johnston and Wilson, above n 61. 
171  Chander, above n 19, 1841. 
172  Julian Lee, ‘Facebook’s Power Should Worry Us All’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 
10 October 2011 <http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/society-and-culture/facebooks-power-
should-worry-us-all-20111009-1lfu0.html>.  
173  ALRC Report, above n 6, vol 3, 2571 [74.141]. 
174  ALRC Report, above n 6, vol 1, 422 [10.9]. 
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According to Hamburg’s DPC, face recognition technology is already moving faster 
than the public debate, and data protection laws are generally unable to keep pace.176 
In the meantime, what is clear is that Facebook’s tentacles are extending not only to 
every corner of the internet but, increasingly, into every corner of our lives. Given the 
amount of personal information, photographic and otherwise, that is uploaded to 
Facebook every day, and given our seemingly insatiable appetite to share more and 
more of our own lives, as well as those of others, Facebook may know more about us 
than our governments, or even our closest friends. Throw into the information mix 
the use of face recognition technology and it is possible that there will be, quite 
literally, nowhere to hide. In an interview with the Wall Street Journal, Google CEO 
Eric Schmidt was quoted as saying: ‘I don't believe society understands what 
happens when everything is available, knowable and recorded by everyone all the 
time,’ and went on to predict that young people may in the future automatically be 
entitled to change their name to ‘disown youthful hijinks stored on their friends’ 
social media sites’.177 Changing one’s name is drastic, but at least feasible. Changing 
one’s face, on the other hand, is quite another thing altogether.178 
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(online), 11 December 2012 <http://www.dw.de/face-recognition-threatens-anonymity-in-
public/a-16431905>. 
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